In this benchmark five-volume study, originally published between 1922 and 1955, Surendranath Dasgupta examines the principal schools of thought that define Indian philosophy. A unifying force greater than art, literature, religion, or science, Professor Dasgupta describes philosophy as the most important achievement of Indian thought, arguing that an understanding of its history is necessary to appreciate the significance and potentialities of India's complex culture. Volume I offers an examination of the Vedas and the Brahmanas, the earlier Upanisads, and the six (...) systems of Indian philosophy. (shrink)

In reply to Wierzbicka's advocacy of semantic primitives we argue that talk of the semantic primitives repeats the fallacies addressed in the target article at a higher level. In reply to Malcolm's plea for a Wittgensteinian grammar of colour words, we argue that he uses words like “we” and “us” too easily, falling into the trap of “silly relativism.” In reply to McManus's science of word counts, we reiterate the nineteenth-century criticism that this method is based on an illegitimate application (...) of seemingly rigorous statistical methods. (shrink)

A systematic and thorough-going account of Fichte's philosophical version of Christianity.--A. C. P.

A full and systematic exposition of the teachings of a thinker who has been hailed as the Avatar of our time. He describes the odyssey of the soul from its creation through its "evolution and involution of consciousness" to its eventual return into the Oversoul. The book is somewhat repetitive, and the profusion of Indian terms together with a certain incoherence make it hard going for the uninitiated--A. C. P.

A paperback reprint of the work in which Cumont shows "how and why a certain Mazdean sect failed under the Caesars to become the dominant religion of the empire."--A. C. P.

The usual representation of quantum algorithms is limited to the process of solving the problem. We extend it to the process of setting the problem. Bob, the problem setter, selects a problem-setting by the initial measurement. Alice, the problem solver, unitarily computes the corresponding solution and reads it by the final measurement. This simple extension creates a new perspective from which to see the quantum algorithm. First, it highlights the relevance of time-symmetric quantum mechanics to quantum computation: the problem-setting and (...) problem solution, in their quantum version, constitute pre- and post-selection, hence the process as a whole is bound to be affected by both boundary conditions. Second, it forces us to enter into relational quantum mechanics. There must be a representation of the quantum algorithm with respect to Bob, and another one with respect to Alice, from whom the outcome of the initial measurement, specifying the setting and thus the solution of the problem, must be concealed. Time-symmetrizing the quantum algorithm to take into account both boundary conditions leaves the representation to Bob unaltered. It shows that the representation to Alice is a sum over histories in each of which she remains shielded from the information coming to her from the initial measurement, not from that coming to her backwards in time from the final measurement. In retrospect, all is as if she knew in advance, before performing her problem-solving action, half of the information that specifies the solution of the problem she will read in the future and could use this information to reach the solution with fewer computation steps. This elucidates the quantum computational speedup in all the quantum algorithms examined. (shrink)

The following papers are contained in this book: "Renaissance Concepts of Man: 1) The Dignity of Man; 2) The Immortality of the Soul; 3) The Unity of Truth" ; "Italian Humanism and Byzantium;" "Byzantine and Western Platonism in the Fifteenth Century;" "Renaissance Philosophy and the Medieval Tradition" and, finally, "History of Philosophy and History of Ideas." All of the essays have been made public, although, to my knowledge, only the last four papers ever appeared in print. The fourth and fifth (...) papers have been published but without footnotes. In his Preface, Professor Kristeller indicates that "the second three essays, in describing the Byzantine and medieval backgrounds of Renaissance thought, offer a supplement to my first Torchbook, Renaissance Thought in which the classical sources of Renaissance thought are discussed." The last paper appeared in the Journal of the History of Philosophy. (shrink)

Schwartz quite decisively puts to rest the long-standing myth that Johnson was, if not openly hostile to science, at least indifferent to it. What emerges is a picture of a man committed to the task of mediating between the new science and the demands of religion and morality. We are presented with some very interesting and provocative historical background on the nature of science, with particular emphasis on its acceptance by literati. Schwartz describes Johnson thus: "His is neither the self-assured (...) smile, the heady, breathless dream, nor the sickness unto death, but rather the measured view." This way of looking at Johnson’s Weltanschauung permeates the entire book. Schwartz is at pains to show that Johnson’s Weltanschauung was one in which religion, morality and science were natural and necessary compliments of one another. Johnson believed that the primacy should be placed on one’s self-knowledge. (shrink)

Contained in this rather short but quite excellent Clarke F. Ansley Award winning work is a skillful presentation of an intriguing thesis: Spinoza’s definition and criterion of truth follows neither the strictly correspondence nor the strictly coherence lines which many commentators have suspected. Rather, says Mark, Spinoza’s doctrine follows the "ontological" view of truth, prevalent in ancient and medieval times. To be true is to be a being, a thing which "is." It is the author’s contention that there are texts (...) which seem to be evidence in favor of interpreting Spinoza’s doctrine along the lines of a correspondence theory, and there are still other texts which seem to betray a kind of family resemblance to the coherence theory of truth. Most commentators, says Mark, have either focused their entire attention on one or the other of these sets of texts, or else pointed out the discrepancy and went on to something else. But what Mark here suggests to us is a rather bold and interesting approach, which, to Mark’s mind, accomplishes the task of facing squarely both sets of texts without compromising either, and without reducing Spinoza to contradiction. (shrink)